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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9291
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2194
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5662
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9262
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6842
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4643
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000480

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND IO; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [BM](#)

SUBJECT: BURMA: GOB REJECTS KACHIN GROUP BORDER GUARD FORCE
COUNTERPROPOSAL

REF: A. 447

[B](#). 478

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

Summary

[1](#)1. (C) Burmese regime officials have rejected the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) "Independence Guard Force" counterproposal to the GOB's "Border Guard Force" (BGF) proposal and seem intent to push ahead with the original BGF. The regime is anxious to complete negotiations with armed ceasefire groups to transition to a BGF by October and is hoping for the "final transformation" to be complete before the elections. The KIO intends to meet again in early August to discuss another counterproposal with Kachin elders, religious figures in the community, and GOB officials. End Summary.

Back to the Drawing Board?

[1](#)2. (C) The GOB on July 9 rejected the KIO counterproposal for a "Kachin Independence Guard Force" in lieu of a BGF (Refs A and B). In a July 25 meeting with Poloff, Kachin Peace negotiators Dr. Saboi Jum and his son, Zau Ma, said the regime's rebuff has left the KIO scrambling to figure out its next step. According to Saboi Jum, the KIO is trying to arrange a meeting for August 9 with top Kachin community leaders and GOB officials to get a better sense of the make-up of the future BGF while reinforcing their proposal and the original tenets of the 1994 ceasefire agreement. (Note: A Thai Embassy official told us recently, following a meeting between a visiting Thai Army official and head of Military Security Affairs Lt. General Ye Myint, that Ye Myint plans to embark on another mission to ceasefire groups beginning o/a August 10. We do not know if this includes the KIO. End note.)

[1](#)3. (C) The KIO and its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) have complained about the vague nature of the regime's BGF proposal and hope the August meeting will shed some light on the envisioned mission of the BGF and what the future role of the KIA would be. According to Saboi Jum, the

KIO wants to circumvent the Northern Commander, Brigadier General Soe Win, and speak with top junta leaders in Nay Pyi Taw, as the Northern Command does not set policy. Saboi Jum said the KIO has no contingency plan if its needs are not satisfied at the August meeting. He added that beginning June 20, the KIA has been mobilizing the 3rd and 4th brigades to the front line, likely readying for a conflict should both sides continue to disagree. (Note: He did not say if the KIA brigades were in a defensive or offensive position. End note.)

Details of Ceasefire Agreements Come to Light

¶4. (C) When asked about the original KIA ceasefire agreement, Saboi Jum said that it is a written agreement with the government. He said the Kachin ceasefire is the only written treaty; the Mon, Wa, and other groups only have verbal agreements with the government.

Comment

¶5. (C) The GOB's apparent reaction to the KIO/KIA, one of the largest ceasefire groups, does not bode well for the smaller groups seeking guarantees of political and military autonomy as the 2010 election nears. The KIO/KIA is interested in discussing transformation with an eye to achieving it, but, aside from continuing to promote its proposals, has little in the way of a backup plan if the GOB

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rejects its demands again. Still unclear is how much the regime, intent to follow through on planned 2010 elections under the "Roadmap to Democracy" and anxious to ensure buy-in from the ceasefire groups, will be willing to compromise.
DINGER